




Productivity and the pandemic: short‑term disruptions 
and long‑term implications
The impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on productivity dynamics by 
industry
Klaas de Vries1 · Abdul Erumban2  · Bart van Ark3 
Accepted: 6 August 2021 / 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
This paper analyses quarterly estimates of productivity growth at industry level for 
three advanced economies, France, the UK and the US, for 2020. We use detailed 
industry-level data to distinguish reallocations of working hours between indus-
tries from pure within-industry productivity gains or losses. We find that all three 
countries showed positive growth rates of aggregate output per hour in 2020 over 
2019. However, after removing the effects from the reallocation of hours between 
low and high productivity industries, only the US still performed positively in terms 
of within-industry productivity growth. In contrast, the two European economies 
showed negative within-industry productivity growth rates in 2020. While above-
average digital-intensive industries outperformed below-average ones in both France 
and the UK, the US showed higher productivity growth in both groups compared 
to the European countries. Industries with medium-intensive levels of shares of 
employees working from home prior to the pandemic made larger productivity gains 
in 2020 than industries with the highest pre-pandemic work-from-home shares. 
Overall, after taking into account the productivity collapse in the hospitality and 
culture sector during 2020, productivity growth shows no clear deviation from the 
slowing pre-pandemic productivity trend. Future trends in productivity growth will 
depend on whether the favourable productivity gains (or smaller losses) in industries 
with above-average digital intensity will outweigh negative effects from the pan-
demic, in particular scarring effects on labour markets and business dynamics.
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1 Introduction
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically disrupted people’s lives as well as 
their economic fortunes in the short-term with possible consequences for the long-
term. The global economy experienced a recession of an unprecedented nature. 
According to The Conference Board, global GDP contracted by 3.7% and GDP per 
capita by 4.5% in 2020. This compares very unfavourable with the global financial 
crisis (GFC) when global GDP declined by less than 1% and per capita income by 
1.8%.1 While one might expect significant growth rebound effects once the pan-
demic fades, it is unclear how the long-term growth rate of the economy will be 
affected.
The growth performance of advanced economies in 2020 was especially affected 
by the pandemic. GDP for the advanced economies fell by 4.7%, nearly 2% points 
more than the fall in the emerging markets, and GDP by per capita dropped by 5.2%. 
The larger decline in advanced economies can be partly explained by lockdowns and 
other government-mandated restrictions of mobility to mitigate the impact of the 
pandemic on people’s health which were not as much implemented in many lower-
income economies. Moreover, the size of the services sector in the advanced econo-
mies is larger and has been more vulnerable to those restrictive measures.
The pandemic and subsequent government interventions in advanced econo-
mies have led to a seemingly perverse effect on productivity growth. Despite the 
dramatic drop in economic activity, labour productivity (measured as GDP per 
hour) in advanced economies increased by, on average, 1.1% in 2020, which is quite 
similar to the trend of the past decade. The reason is that according to The Con-
ference Board’s series the decline in total hours worked (5.8%) was even bigger 
than the fall in real output (4.7%). Less than half of the decline in total hours (2.6 
percentage point) was due to a drop in the number of persons employed while the 
remainder came from a fall in average hours per person employed. This decline in 
working hours has, to a large extent, resulted from business support programmes 
and furlough programmes for employees, which governments implemented to miti-
gate the short-term impact of the pandemic on business failures and employment. 
As a result, the average number of annual hours per worker in advanced economies 
dropped by more than 3% from 1718 to 1661 hours, though with large differences 
between countries and sectors.2
Productivity growth is, of course, best analysed in a long-term context (Krug-
man 1994).3 Investments in human and physical capital, technology and innovation 
are only materialising in improved business and economic efficiencies in the longer 
term. Short-term productivity changes during a recession, therefore, need to be care-
fully interpreted. For example:
1 https:// www. confe rence- board. org/ data/ econo mydat abase/, April 2021.
2 https:// www. confe rence- board. org/ data/ econo mydat abase/, April 2021.
3 Krugman’s phrase was “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A 
country’s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise 
its output per worker.”.
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– The numerator (output index) and denominator (input index) in the productivity 
equation can change rapidly and be highly volatile, which will exacerbate swings 
in the productivity index.
– Data revisions of value, prices and resulting volumes of output and inputs may 
be especially large during times of crisis due to distortions in data collection.
– Downward shocks in one period may create large rebound effects in subsequent 
periods and therefore obscure the underlying long-term drivers when looking at 
the short-term indicators on a quarter-by-quarter or month-by-month basis.
– A crisis may impact sectors in different ways causing large shifts in employment 
shares leading to temporary reallocations of labour between low productivity 
and high productivity sectors. This has especially occurred during the pandemic, 
as mobility restrictions and mandated business shutdowns disproportionally 
affected sectors that were highly dependent on direct customer-facing contacts, 
in particular hospitality services, the cultural sector and parts of the retail sector 
(except essential retail services, like supermarkets).
– During the pandemic, the utilisation of human capital has been affected as a 
result of fiscal support programmes for business and employment furlough pro-
grammes.
– The utilisation of physical capital, such as buildings and machinery and equip-
ment, also declines rapidly during a crisis. Adjustments for capacity utilisation 
can be large, and highly different between industries.4
Despite those concerns, there has been much conversation and some hard 
evidence that apart from the crisis-related effects described above, the pan-
demic may also have caused genuine productivity improvements. Some of 
those pure productivity effects may be related to the accelerated adoption of 
digital technologies by businesses (Bloom et al. 2021a; Riom and Valero 2021; 
McCann and Vorley 2021). Other effects are due to a rise in the number of peo-
ple working from home, which may have caused improvements in digital com-
munications and an acceleration in the digital processing of business informa-
tion (Barrero et al. 2020; Taneja et al. 2021). Some of those improvements may 
just cause transitory productivity effects, but others could be of a permanent 
nature (Bloom et al. 2021b; Bighelli et al. 2021; McKinsey 2021).
While it is too early to precisely determine what the long-term economic effects 
of the pandemic will be, this paper aims to examine the latest estimates of produc-
tivity by industry and the possible long-term implications for productivity growth. 
We analyse quarterly estimates of productivity growth for 36 industries in three 
advanced countries, France, the UK and the US, for 2020 and the first quarter of 
2021. We remove the productivity effects from reallocations of working hours 
between industries to focus on the pure productivity gains or losses within industries 
in driving aggregate productivity growth.5
4 Fernald (2014) and ONS (2021b).
5 For other analysis along those lines, see ONS (2021b) for the UK and Blit et  al. (2020) and Wang 
(2021) for Canada.
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We find that while all three countries showed positive growth rates of aggregate out-
put per hour in 2020 over 2019, after removing the effects from reallocations between 
low and high productivity industries, only the US showed positive productivity growth 
within its industries (1.5%), whereas the two European economies showed negative 
within-industry productivity growth rates (France at − 1.1% and the UK at − 1.9%).6
We then proceed by grouping the 36 industries using three taxonomies. The first 
taxonomy is a simple sector taxonomy based on type of activities, clustering indus-
tries in five main sectors: manufacturing, “other industry” (comprising agriculture, 
mining, utilities and construction), market services (excluding hospitality and cul-
ture), hospitality and culture, and non-market services. We find highly different 
within-industry productivity contributions between countries. For example, in the 
US, within-industry productivity contributions were broad-based. Manufacturing, 
other industry and market services (excl. hospitality and culture) all showed posi-
tive within-industry productivity contributions. In the UK, only manufacturing and 
other industry showed a modestly positive effect on aggregate productivity growth, 
whereas in France, non-market services were the only sectors with positive within-
industry contributions to aggregate productivity growth.
Our second taxonomy considers one specific aspect of digital transformation dur-
ing the pandemic, that is, the productivity effects from working from home (WFH). 
We find no evidence of within-industry productivity growth benefits for the top 
quartile of high-intensive WFH industries vis-à-vis medium-intensive ones (the two 
middle quartiles). In fact, as the medium-intensive WFH industries made bigger pro-
ductivity gains, they may have been catching up with the high-intensive WFH indus-
tries by implementing the basics of WFH during the pandemic. It may take time 
and effort before the productivity effects from WFH, and especially the anticipated 
increase in hybrid WFH models combining part-time work-from-home and work-in-
office models, will become large enough to show up in the data as a clear differentia-
tor between strongly and weakly performing industries.
The third taxonomy, which looks at digital transformation more broadly, provides a 
somewhat more favourable perspective on the productivity impact of new digital tech-
nologies introduced during the pandemic. Distinguishing industries by their usage of 
digital technology, including industry purchases of ICT goods and services, the share of 
ICT specialists in total employment and the share of turnover from online sales, we found 
better long-term performance in above-average digital intensive industries during the pre-
pandemic period (van Ark et al. 2019, 2021). During the pandemic, above average digital-
intensive industries showed higher productivity growth than below-average ones. In the 
US, both groups performed about the same but better than in France and the UK.
Overall we conclude that, after adjusting for the large industry reallocation 
effects, and with the notable exception of the collapse in productivity in the hospi-
tality and culture sector, the within-industry growth patterns during the pandemic 
showed no clear deviation from the slowing long-term productivity trend as estab-
lished in our earlier work (van Ark et al. 2019, 2021).
6 In Q1-2021 the within-industry productivity growth over Q4-2020 was − 0.2% in France, 0% in the UK 
and 1% in the US (Appendix Tables 4, 5, 6).
544 K. de Vries et al.
1 3
This sobering conclusion implies by no means that the pandemic could not turn 
out to be a source of a potential sustained productivity improvement during the post-
pandemic period. Our analysis suggests that digital transformation seems to have 
progressed during the pandemic through favourable productivity gains (or smaller 
losses) in industries that are above-average users of digital technologies. Productiv-
ity growth during the post-pandemic period will depend on whether such positive 
effects will outweigh possible negative effects from the pandemic, in particular scar-
ring effects on labour markets and unfavourable business dynamics.
The large differences in productivity performance between countries during the 
pandemic also suggest that country-specific factors such as the response of inno-
vation ecosystems to the opportunities for adoption of new technologies play an 
important role in the future. Such differences in policy environment may also have a 
significant impact on the within-country regional fortunes of a productivity revival.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the aggregate trends in 
productivity growth in France, the UK and the US for 2020, and compare them with 
pre-pandemic performance. We briefly discuss some of the key data quality issues, 
and address the impact of the business support and furlough programmes on pro-
ductivity. In Section 3 we outline the shift-share technique used to separate the pure 
or within-industry contributions to aggregate productivity growth from the industry 
reallocation effects. In Section 4 we present the results from our three taxonomies 
(type of activity, working-from-home and digital intensity). In the final section we 
conclude by outlining the implications of the pandemic for productivity growth in 
the long-term.
2  Key aggregate productivity trends during the pandemic
2.1  General overview up to the first quarter of 2021
Over the course of 2020 and early 2021, labour productivity growth has been very 
volatile. Measured as GDP divided by total hours worked, it moved sharply up and 
down between quarters in France and the UK while it increased in the second quarter 
in the US without seeing any major downward correction since (Fig. 1; Table 1). On 
a yearly basis, productivity increased in all three countries because output declined 
less than the total number of hours worked. As explained below, these positive pro-
ductivity effects resulted from active government interventions to mitigate the imme-
diate economic fallout from the crisis even though the channels were quite different, 
especially between France and the UK on the one hand, and the US on the other.
When the pandemic hit, all three economies recorded a sharp contraction in 
output in the second quarter of 2020 (Table  1). On March 11 2020, the World 
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, and by the end of that 
month many governments worldwide had implemented restrictions on the mobil-
ity of people, which caused a contraction of economic activity towards the end of 
Q1-20 and most of Q2-20. Along with generally increased uncertainty, this led to 
sharp drops in the mobility of persons though generally more so in France and the 
UK than in the US (Fig. 2). The fall in real output in Q2-20 was largest in the UK, 
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while the US saw a much smaller drop in output because of smaller restrictions 
in mobility. In France and the US the impact of the pandemic on labour input, as 
measured by the total number of hours worked, was bigger than the reduction in 
output, leading to gains in measured labour productivity of 7.0% in the US and 
3.1% in France in Q2-20. In the UK, hours fell slightly less than real output, so 
that productivity dropped by 1.5%.
By Q3-20, the three economies started to open up again as daily COVID-19 
infections were significantly reduced. This led to a rebound in economic activity, 
thereby reversing many of the output and labour inputs losses induced in Q2-20. 
This was especially the case in France, where mobility indicators in Q3-20 came 
close to fully recovering to their pre-pandemic levels (Fig.  2), as did real GDP 
(Table  1). The recovery in labour input in France was even more impressive 
than the growth of output, resulting in a large drop in measured productivity—
thereby erasing most of the productivity gains from Q2-20. In the UK, output also 
rebounded strongly, but total hours worked grew at a much more tepid pace, lead-
ing to a sharp increase labour productivity in Q3-20.
Table 1  Growth rates of real GDP, total hours worked and labour productivity, 2020 annual average and 
2020-Q1 to 2021-Q1 (q/q), France, UK and US (% change). Sources “Appendix 1”. Based on INSEE 
(France), BEA and BLS (US), ONS (UK)
The employment rate is calculated as a percent of the population; unemployment rate calculated as a 
percent of the labour force
y/y (%) Quarter over quarter change (%)
2020/2019 2020-Q1 2020-Q2 2020-Q3 2020-Q4 2021-Q1
France
 Real GDP  − 8.0  − 5.9  − 13.2 18.5  − 1.5  − 0.1
 Total hours worked  − 9.2  − 4.4  − 18.9 23.4  − 2.7 0.1
 Productivity 1.3  − 1.5 7.0  − 4.0 1.2  − 0.2
 Employment rate (15–64) 66.1 66.8 65.2 65.9 66.5 66.5
 Unemployment rate (15–64) 5.8 5.7 5.1 6.7 5.8 5.9
UK
 Real GDP  − 9.8  − 2.8  − 19.5 16.9 1.3  − 1.6
 Total hours worked  − 10.3  − 2.0  − 18.2 10.0 5.7  − 2.2
 Productivity 0.5  − 0.9  − 1.5 6.3  − 4.2 0.7
 Employment rate (16–64) 75.4 76.3 75.7 75.0 74.7 74.7
 Unemployment rate (16–64) 4.7 4.1 4.2 5.0 5.3 5.0
US
 Real GDP  − 3.5  − 1.3  − 9.0 7.5 1.1 1.6
 Total hours worked  − 5.8  − 1.1  − 11.7 7.0 2.0 0.7
 Productivity 2.5  − 0.2 3.1 0.5  − 0.9 0.8
 Employment rate (16–64) 67.1 71.5 62.7 66.3 67.8 68.4
 Unemployment rate (16–64) 8.2 3.9 13.1 8.8 7.1 6.1
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Fig. 1  Real GDP per hour worked index (2019Q1 = 100), US, UK and France. Sources “Appendix 1”. 
INSEE (France), BEA and BLS (US), ONS (UK)
Fig. 2  Mobility: weekly averages of trips to Grocery and Pharma and Retail and Recreation (% change 
from baseline), US, UK and France.  Source own calculations using Google COVID-19 Community 
Mobility Reports, accessed on 27 May 2021
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By Q4-20, daily infections were rising rapidly again as a second wave of COVID-
19 cases got underway, leading to renewed lockdowns in France and the UK, though 
not as severely in the US. The economic impact of the renewed restrictions on 
mobility was much smaller compared to the first lockdowns in Q2-20. Restrictions 
were often more targeted towards specific economic activities and firms had learned 
to keep some business going despite the lockdowns. There was possibly also less 
fear among consumers to remain mobile as more information on the main transition 
mechanisms of the disease had become known.
In the UK, output increased slightly in Q4-20, while the labour market recovery 
was even much stronger. As a result, productivity growth recorded a sharp fall. In 
France, the renewed lockdown caused a fall in output though it was relatively small 
compared to the decline in Q2-20. In the US, growth in output was slower than the 
recovery in total hours worked, causing a modest decline in labour productivity for 
the first time since Q1-20.
On an annual basis, productivity levels in 2020 as measured by the aggregate data 
were slightly (in France and the UK) or substantially (in the US) above the pre-pan-
demic level of 2019. In Q1-21, when the third wave of COVID-19 hit, the UK saw 
a contraction in GDP with an even larger fall in hours worked, whereas the effects 
were more limited in France. In the US, output increased more than working hours 
during Q1-21, pointing at the beginnings of a pro-cyclical recovery path.
2.2  The impact of business support and furlough programmes on productivity
In response to the pandemic, governments massively intervened to support busi-
nesses and workers during the crisis, but the effects on output, persons employed, 
hours worked and productivity were quite different between the three countries. In 
the US, unemployment increased rapidly, especially in sectors that were hardest hit 
by the pandemic, such as hospitality services and culture. Benefits were temporarily 
raised to cushion the blow for workers, but the link between employers and employ-
ees in lockdown industries was not retained. In France and the UK, this link between 
employers and employees was retained by sending workers home but continuing 
their pay on the basis of wage subsidies (or furlough schemes). The result of these 
divergent policies was a rapid rise in the unemployment rate in the US (from 3.9% in 
Q1-20 to 13.1% in Q2-20, and still at 6.1% by Q1-21) versus only small increases in 
the unemployment rates for France (from 5.7% in Q1-20 to 6.7% in Q3-20) and the 
UK (4.1% in Q1-20 to 5.3 in Q4-20). Meanwhile, all three countries provided direct 
financial support to businesses to remain afloat despite large income losses.
Because of those different schemes, if we would measure labour productivity as 
output per person employed instead of output per hour, the declines in labour pro-
ductivity in the UK and France would have been much larger than an on output per 
hour-basis (as workers were still considered as in being employed). In contrast, out-
put per person employed in the US it would have increased much more than output 
per hour (as workers were laid off). In terms of GDP per hour all three countries saw 
productivity go up, but more so in the US where output and total hours declined less 
than in France and the UK (see Table 1).
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2.3  Data quality issues
Due to the disruption of the pandemic, regular data collection in 2020 has also 
been hampered, leading to larger than usual uncertainties around the estimates of 
output and inputs (BLS 2021; ONS 2021a; OECD 2021a). The pandemic has also 
highlighted how differences in the measurement of volume estimates of GDP may 
impede international comparisons. For example, the UK’s Office for National Sta-
tistics highlights differences in the structure of the economy (e.g. the higher share of 
social consumption in the UK) and in measurement methods to explain the relatively 
large fall in UK’s GDP compared to other G7 economies (ONS 2021a).
In particular, ONS argues that current price or nominal estimates should be more 
comparable on an international basis, and that the UK’s performance based on that 
metric has not been all that different compared to other economies. Comparing a 
large set of economies, the OECD however finds that differences in government 
consumption and non-market output account for only a small part of cross-country 
variation in GDP growth (OECD 2021a).
Furthermore, alternative measures of economic activity, such as Google mobility 
measures, track the fall in real GDP in G7 economies (and in the case of the US, total 
hours worked) fairly well (Fig. 3). Figure 3 shows that the fall in total hours worked was 
also very similar to the fall in real GDP in most countries, with the notable exception 
of Canada. Both indicators (total hours worked and google mobility) dropped off much 
more in the UK than in most comparator countries. Hence these two data points support 
the view that the drop in real GDP in the UK was indeed among the largest in the G7.
Fig. 3  Growth rates of nominal and real GDP, total hours worked and Google mobility, G7, 2020 (% 
change). Notes Google mobility reports refer to the annual average of trips to Grocery and Pharma and 
Retail and Recreation as a percentage change from the baseline (the first 6 weeks of 2020). Sources own 
calculations using data from Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, accessed on 27 May 
2021; INSEE (France), BEA and BLS (US), ONS (UK); StatCan (Canada); Bbk (Germany); CAO and 
The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Japan)
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Other issues related to measurement might involve the possible understatement 
of household output (including, for example, home schooling) and household inputs 
(including intangible assets in the household; see Eberly et al. 2021) during the lock-
down, increases in hidden unemployment (less intensive work) and capacity utilisation 
adjustments. The latter especially complicates the measurement of total factor productiv-
ity, which we do not address in this paper except for the long-term projections in the final 
section. Finally, the pandemic also has led to a rethinking of the role of global supply 
chains in productivity growth, and a reassessment of how efficiency gains versus supply 
chain resiliency requirements affect the measures of productivity (OECD 2021b).
3  Removing labor reallocation effects to measure pure industry 
productivity contributions
3.1  The shift‑share aggregation method
The aggregate productivity growth rates for 2020 as described in Section  2 have 
been highly impacted by large shifts of output and employment between indus-
tries. In particular, the measured reallocation effects (as discussed in this section) 
in Q2-20 and Q3-20 were abnormally high compared to any of the four quarters 
of 2019 or Q1-21 (see “Appendix  2” Table  7). Most notably the temporary clos-
ing and gradual reopening of firms in the hospitality and culture sectors, which are 
typically characterised by relatively low levels of labour productivity compared to 
sectors such as manufacturing or digital services, saw a large reduction in their share 
of output and employment causing positive reallocation effects on aggregate produc-
tivity growth in Q2-20 followed by partial rebounds in Q3-20 and Q4-20. In order 
to properly identify the within-industry effects, we employ the so-called shift-share 
approach in this paper.
There are different methods of aggregating industry-level productivity growth 
rates to distinguish between industry reallocation effects and pure within-industry 
effects on aggregate productivity growth. While these methods make relatively little 
difference in terms of empirical results during normal times, they do more so when 
output and labour input changes are volatile as was the case in 2020. A comparison 
of the shift-share approach used in this paper with two other alternative aggregation 
methods is provided in “Appendix 2”.
A common approach to measuring productivity growth is to assume an aggregate 
production function, which allows summing value added and hours across industries 
to obtain aggregate value added (Y) and aggregate hours worked (H) (see Jorgenson 
et al. 2012).7 With this additive property, one can measure aggregate labour produc-







7 The underlying assumptions include separability of gross output production function in value added for 
each industry and same value added function across all industries.




 is the real value added and H
i
 is the number of hours worked, both for 
industry i. y is the aggregate labour productivity measured as real value added per 
hour worked. This approach assumes identical industry value added functions so 
that aggregate GDP ( Yt) is the sum of industry value added.
Using aggregate labour productivity as defined in (1), the shift-share decompo-
sition approach separates the within-industry productivity effect from the labour 
input reallocation effects across industries (Fabricant 1942). In this approach, the 
absolute difference in aggregate productivity levels is decomposed into a pure 
within-industry productivity component, which is the change in industry produc-
tivity weighted by the relative employment size of the industry in the previous 
period, the change in employment share weighted by the productivity level in the 
previous period, and the product of changes in employment share and productivity 
level, i.e.
where yt, is as in (1), is the aggregate labour productivity obtained using aggregate 
production function, and s
i,t
 is the employment share of the sector in the aggregate 
economy. Dividing both sides by the previous period aggregate labour productivity 
levels, we can express (2) in growth rate form as:
where ẏt is the growth rate of aggregate labour productivity. The first term is the 
absolute change in each industry’s productivity level relative to the aggregate 
economy productivity, weighted by the previous period’s employment shares. 
This will be positive if the industry productivity improves, and the magnitude 
of the positive value depends upon the relative size of the industry in terms of 
employment. In other words, when the productivity of an industry improves, the 
aggregate productivity also improves in proportion to the industry size in terms of 
employment. This is the “pure” or within-industry productivity effect, which is the 
focus of this paper.
The second and last terms are the static and dynamic worker reallocation—or work-
ers’ movement from low productivity to high productivity sectors, which together 
make up the reallocation effect. The static shift-effect measures the relative level of 
industry productivity weighted by the absolute change in employment share from the 
previous period. This effect will be negative if employment expands in sectors with 
relatively lower productivity levels. The dynamic shift effect represents the change in 
industry productivity relative to aggregate productivity in the previous period and the 
change in employment share. Therefore, when employment expands in sectors where 
productivity growth is faster, it adds to aggregate productivity growth. The static real-
location captures the aggregate productivity effect of employment expansion in sectors 
with a relatively higher level of productivity, whereas the dynamic reallocation cap-
tures the effect of employment expansion in fast-growing sectors.
(2)Δyt =
∑
si,t−1 ⋅ Δyi,t +
∑
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While decomposing aggregate productivity growth using Eq. (3), we use detailed 
industry data on output and labour input—66 industries for the UK, 50 for France, 
and 48 for the US. The level of industry details impacts the magnitude of realloca-
tion effects, and the contribution of pure productivity effects. At a higher level of 
industry grouping, the potential to pick up the effects of movements of output or 
employment across industries is less compared to a lower level of industry group-
ings. For instance, if we take three sectors, such as agriculture, industry, and ser-
vices, then the decomposition method only captures labour input movements 
between these broadly defined sectors. In contrast, if we have detailed industries 
within these three broad groups, the decomposition captures all the movements even 
within these broad sectors.8
4  Within‑industry productivity effects on basis of industry 
taxonomies
4.1  Description of the taxonomies
In order to detect patterns in the productivity data over the course of the recession 
and recovery, we applied the shift-share method described in Section 3 to the avail-
able industry data which we subsequently grouped into 36 industries using three 
taxonomies (Exhibit 1). The first taxonomy clusters industries in similar types of 
activities, such as physical production (manufacturing and non-manufacturing), 
and private (market) and public (non-market) services delivery. The “other indus-
try” group includes activities such as agriculture, mining, utilities and construction. 
Hospitality and culture, which includes hotels, restaurants, arts, entertainment and 
recreation (ISIC Rev.4 codes I55-56 and R90-93), are grouped together as they were 
most impacted by government-mandated restrictions over the course of the pan-
demic. Non-market services mainly include government, education, human health 
and social care activities. It should be noted that in the US a large part of non-mar-
ket services is carried out by the private sector business, limiting the comparability 
of non-market services between countries somewhat. We removed a large part of the 
real estate industry from our analysis representing owner-occupied housing which is 
unrelated to any specific workforce activity (see “Appendix 1”).
8 The quantitative impact of different levels of aggregation is demonstrated for the UK by ONS (2021b, 
Fig.  4). Their decomposition using five sectors: agriculture, mining and utilities, manufacturing, con-
struction, financial services, and all non-financial services, shows smaller reallocation effects compared 
to their sectional aggregation containing 17 industries and divisional aggregation consisting of nearly 90 
detailed industry groups. The results show that the detailed industry breakdown provides larger realloca-
tion effects, although there can also be offsetting effects between industries.
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Exhibit 1: Taxonomies based on type of activity, working-from-home and digital 
intensity
Note:* Excludes output computations for owner-occupied housing (see Appendix A).
The second taxonomy allows us to look at the productivity impact of working-
from-home (WFH) during the pandemic. We used detailed data from the Ameri-
can Time Use Survey (ATUS), and averaged the values of the prevalence of work-
from-home by industry over the period 2011–2019. To convert the ATUS worker 
level data, which are based on occupational classification from the US Census, to 
our industry classification, we relied on the underlying crosswalks and codes from 
Hensvik et al. (2020). Similar to their approach, we aggregated the share of WFH 
hours by industry from worker-level data to create our taxonomy. We identify three 
groups of industries, based on a quartile distribution with the two middle quartiles 
qualifying as ‘medium working-from-home’. Two important assumptions, guided by 
the availability of data, are made when applying this taxonomy to the three countries 
in this paper. The first is that we assume that WFH patterns by occupation/industry 
in the US are not very dissimilar from those in the UK and France. The second is 
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that we use historical data to determine the prevalence of working-from-home by 
industry, although we acknowledge that most industries will have increased WFH 
activities in 2020 (ONS 2021c).
The third taxonomy looks at the digital intensity of sectors, following our ear-
lier work on digital transformation and productivity growth (van Ark et  al. 2019, 
2021). For this, we adopted the digital intensity taxonomy developed by the OECD, 
which uses multiple dimensions of digital transformation related to technology, mar-
ket and human capital-related features (Calvino et al. 2018). These include the share 
of intermediate purchases of ICT goods and services, the share of ICT specialists in 
total employment and the share of turnover from online sales. Using an overall sum-
mary indicator (the ‘global taxonomy’), we collapsed industries at the ISIC Rev.4 
level into two groups: above average and below average digital-intensive industries. 
We also separated out a third group of industries which are producing digital goods 
and services, including computers, electronic and electrical equipment, and tele-
com and other digital service. Hence our above and below average digital-intensive 
industries are essentially digital ‘using’ industries.
4.2  Sector taxonomy results
The first two columns of Table 2 provide an overview of the shares of each sector 
in nominal value added and total hours worked. The last column provides the level 
of productivity in each sector relative to that of the aggregate economy in 2019. 
In contrast to common wisdom, we find no significant difference in the size of the 
manufacturing sector between the three countries. The biggest difference between 
the three countries is that the size of the market services sector is slightly bigger in 
the UK than in France, whereas non-market services are bigger in France than in 
the UK.9 We also find, as expected, that productivity levels in manufacturing and 
market services (excl. hospitality and culture) are higher than those of other sectors 
in all three economies. Shifts between those sectors therefore drive some of the large 
industry reallocation effects in 2020, as described above.
Focusing on the contributions to productivity growth from industries (excluding 
the reallocation effects) in 2020, we find some important differences between the 
three countries (Table 3). In the UK, the manufacturing sector and the “other indus-
try” sector contributed positively to within-industry productivity growth, whereas 
the three service sectors performed negatively, in particular non-market services 
(and especially education and health care industries). In France, manufacturing, 
other industry and hospitality and culture showed negative within-industry produc-
tivity contributions, whereas market services and non-market services performed 
positively. In the US, the manufacturing sector (in particular industries producing 
primary metals), other industry (in particular oil and gas exploitation and construc-
tion) and many market service activities (with air transportation services being the 
main exception) showed positive within-industry productivity growth rates in 2020. 
9 Comparison of market services and non-market services results with the US is somewhat flawed as 
the “non-market services sector” includes health and education which to a large extent are private sector 
activities in the US.
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As in the two European countries hospitality and culture and non-market services 
(in particular the healthcare industry) showed negative within-industry productivity 
growth rates in the US.
We conclude that the gain in productivity during the pandemic was broad-based 
in the US, and that any drop in output was more than offset by a drop in working 
hours for most US industries. In contrast, the two European countries retained a fair 
amount of less productive hours despite the extensive use of furlough programmes 
pointing at an underutilisation of labour. What this better US performance means for 
the recovery potential coming out of the pandemic, requires a closer look at the pro-
ductivity contributions according to the other two industry taxonomies.
4.3  Working‑from‑home taxonomy results
There has been much discussion to what extent the rapid acceleration in working-
from-home has driven productivity improvements. Barrero et al. (2020) observe that 
the number of full workdays from home in the US increased from 5% in the pre-
pandemic period to 20% during the pandemic. The Office of National Statistics in 
the UK reported that, during the second wave of COVID-19 infections in February 
2021, 37% of persons employed worked fully from home, 10% worked partly from 
home and partly from work, and 34% travelled into work permanently. By the third 
Table 2  Pre-pandemic output and hours shares and productivity levels using taxonomies (2019). Sources 
“Appendix 1”. Based on INSEE (France), BEA and BLS (US), ONS (UK)
a Other industry includes agriculture, mining, utilities and construction
b Market services excludes hospitality and culture as well as owner occupied dwellings




Hours worked share 
(%)
Productivity level 
(total economy = 1.00)
France UK US France UK US France UK US
Sectors
 Manufacturing 12 11 11 10 9 9 1.25 1.20 1.24
 Other  industrya 11 12 9 12 11 10 0.81 1.07 0.84
 Market  servicesb 50 52 48 46 49 44 1.11 1.02 1.10
 Hospitality and culture 5 5 4 7 8 8 0.65 0.53 0.54
 Non-market services 23 20 28 26 23 29 0.89 0.98 0.96
Work-from-home (WFH) intensity
 High WFH 24 24 18 20 21 19 1.20 1.11 0.96
 Medium WFH 56 56 66 58 54 58 0.99 1.03 1.13
 Low WFH 19 20 16 22 24 23 0.85 0.81 0.71
Digital intensity
 Above average digital-intensivec 45 47 58 49 48 54 0.94 0.95 1.07
 Below average digital-intensive 48 45 33 47 47 42 1.00 0.99 0.79
 Digital producing 7 9 9 4 6 4 1.74 1.49 2.07
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week of June 2021, those travelling into work permanently had gone up to from 34 
to 49%, 15% of persons employed were on a hybrid model, and only 22% worked 
from home entirely (ONS 2021e). So as the share of workers from home drops 
as economies emerge from lockdowns and mobility restrictions get eased, a fair 
amount of WFH is likely to remain because it has worked well for many employ-
ers and workers. One UK survey found that as much as 40% of workers would like 
to have two to three workdays from home by 2022, with the remainder equally split 
between 0–1 and 4–5 days (Taneja et al., 2021).
Barrero et al. (2021) suggest a 5% boost in US productivity in the post-pandemic 
period because of re-optimised working arrangements. The Conference Board 
(2021) is more cautious in predicting permanent productivity gains from WFH. Its 
survey data from US employers during the fall of 2020, suggest that much of the 
output gains may have resulted from longer working hours rather than higher pro-
ductivity from home workers. The study also warns of the potential negative impact 
of WFH on collaboration and organisational culture.
The results from our industry taxonomy confirm the caution on the productivity effects 
from WFH as we see no clear advantage from within-industry productivity contributions 
from industries that showed the highest pre-pandemic WFH prevalence. In the UK the 
high-intensity WFH industries even contributed negatively to productivity growth, in par-
ticular due to negative contributions from the education industry. In the US, the within-
productivity contribution from high-intensity WFH industries was moderately positive 
(0.5%) but less than the contribution of medium-intensity WFH industries (0.9%). Clearly, 
low-intensity WFH industries performed worse in all three countries, but for many indus-
tries in that group, the potential for working-from-home is much lower because of either 
the production-oriented or customer-facing nature of the business.
We conclude that, despite the rapid rise in WFH during 2020, the productivity 
effects are not clearly visible yet, especially not in industries where the WFH inten-
sity was the highest in the pre-pandemic period. These results align with Wang 
(2021), who also finds no correlation between WFH intensity and productivity 
growth in Canada in 2020. However, as the taxonomy is based on pre-pandemic 
data, industries which were classified as medium-intensive WFH during the pre-
pandemic period may have benefited in terms of productivity growth terms as they 
moved towards higher-intensity WFH practices during 2020. Those productivity 
effects may reflect low hanging fruit from more efficient communications and time 
savings from commuting. It may still take time and considerable effort before WFH 
will generate sustained improvements in productivity growth through new working 
processes which need to align with a continuous evolution of digital architectures, 
raising the need for better digital skills, safer data security protocols, etc.
4.4  Digital usage taxonomy results
Positive productivity effects from the pandemic are more clearly visible from digi-
tal transformation in a broader sense. In our earlier work, we documented improve-
ments in productivity growth in above average digital-intensity industries for most 
of the decade between the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, 
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despite slowing aggregate productivity growth during that period especially since 
2011 (Table 3). The Euro Area and the UK showed larger productivity contributions 
from above average digital-intensive industries, especially after 2013. And even 
though US productivity in the past decade was mostly driven by high productiv-
ity in digital producing industries, above-average digital-intensive industries outper-
formed the least intensive ones by a wide margin. Examples of strong productivity 
growth in intensive digital-using industries include many services industries, such as 
finance, trade and business services (van Ark et al. 2019, 2021).
By applying the digital usage taxonomy to data for 2020 we find a continuation 
of the gradual strengthening impact of digital intensity on productivity. The produc-
tivity contributions from the above average digital-intensive industries in the UK 
turned negative in 2020, and it was barely positive for France. However, in both 
countries this group of industries outperformed below average digital-intensive 
industries by a much wider margin than before the pandemic. The gap in the pro-
ductivity contributions between the two sectors was 1.1 percentage points in France 
and 1.2 percentage points in 2020 compared to much smaller gaps from 2011 to 
2019 (Table 3). For the US, the productivity contribution of both the above-average 
and below-average digital-intensive industries is somewhat comparable at 0.4 to 0.5 
percentage points of the 1.5% within-industry productivity growth. The remaining 
0.6% originated from the  relatively large digital producing sector which (in 2019) 
accounted for only 9% of the US value added and 4% of total hours worked.
Overall, there are reasons to be optimistic about productivity gains from digital 
transformation during the post-pandemic era, especially in industries which already 
showed above average digital-intensity before the pandemic. Firms which showed 
a good record of technology adoption in the past are usually better in continuing to 
do so. For below average digital-intensity industries the potential for catching up 
could be substantial, especially because of a strengthening in technology adoption 
and the introduction of new management practices during the pandemic (Riom and 
Valero 2021; McKinsey 2021). However, the process of digital transformation is a 
lengthy one. The time lag between adopting the new technologies and the time by 
which they show up in productivity are related to learning effects, giving an advan-
tage to industries which had already realised those effects earlier. There are also a 
substantial number of firms at risk of falling behind in their digital transformation 
process which may either fail in due course or may only survive in a less competi-
tive environment in which productivity is not necessarily a growth driver.
5  Conclusions and productivity outlook
The dynamics of productivity growth are best understood in the longer term. How-
ever, in times of crisis, analysing short-term productivity trends can help to reflect 
on whether the crisis might cause lasting damage to productivity or create oppor-
tunities for a revival in productivity growth. After removing significant industry 
reallocation effects, this paper analyses the pure within-industry contributions to 
aggregate productivity growth in 2020. Using various taxonomies, the underlying 
within-industry contributions to productivity growth provide useful information on 
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the extent to which the pandemic may have weakened or strengthened drivers of 
productivity growth in the longer term.
Our results indicate that digital transformation during the pandemic seems to 
have progressed in industries with above-average digital intensity. We also find that 
the productivity performance in medium-intensive work-from-home industries is 
better than in high-intensive ones, suggesting that the former may be showing signs 
of catching up with the latter. Yet, after taking account of the productivity impact 
of the collapse in the hospitality and culture sectors, the remaining within-industry 
productivity growth patterns during 2020 do not exhibit a clear deviation from the 
slowing long-term trend productivity trend established in our earlier work (van Ark 
et al. 2019, 2021).
We find important differences in 2020 productivity growth between countries, 
especially between France and the UK on the one hand, and the US on the other. 
Beyond hospitality and culture, the stronger within-industry productivity contri-
butions in the US may simply result from the heavy shedding of persons and total 
working hours at the start of the pandemic. In contrast, the European furlough 
programmes may have caused companies to keep more hours on the payroll than 
they would have done otherwise given the collapse in output. While the average 
unemployment rate in the US in Q1-21 was still slightly higher than in the UK and 
France, its employment rate was slightly above that of France but well below that 
in the UK (see Table 1). It remains to be seen whether a further recovery in the US 
labour market upholds faster productivity growth compared to France and the UK, 
or whether an increase in the employment rate slows the pace of within-industry 
productivity gains.
Projections by The Conference Board point to a stronger recovery of the long-term 
trend in productivity growth in the US than in France and the UK (Fig. 4). The pro-
jections are based on period-average projections of the contributions of capital deep-
ening (measured as capital services per hour worked), labour quality (measured by 
educational attainment levels of the workforce) and total factor productivity.10 The 
projections suggest that  US labour productivity growth could see a recovery from 
0.7% in the past decade (2011–2019) to 1.8% in the next decade (2020–2030), which 
is comparable to the average productivity growth rate in the US from 1990 to 2010. 
In contrast, the projections for the two European countries suggest productivity 
growth rates much closer to the lower rate of the past decade (2010–2019), namely 
0.9% in France and a slight increase from 0.4% (2011–2019) to 0.6% (2020–2030) in 
the UK. A significant pickup in capital deepening is the main driver of faster labour 
productivity growth in the US, whereas capital deepening remains largely unchanged 
in France and the UK. All three countries see a modest return to positive total factor 
10 The projections by The Conference Board are based on a supply-side growth accounting model that 
estimates the contributions of the use of factor inputs—labour and capital—and total factor productivity 
growth to the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP). While labour input growth rates are esti-
mated using data on demographic changes and participation rates—including an estimation to adjust for 
the change in the composition (or quality) of the workforce—capital input and total factor productivity 
growth are econometrically estimated using a wide range of related variables during past periods. The 
obtained trend growth rates for the first projection period (currently 2021–2023) are adjusted for possible 
deviations between actual and potential output in the short run (Erumban and de Vries 2018).
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productivity (TPF) growth during the next decade. Overall the results suggest that 
digital transformation, at least in the US, remains biased towards the growth of capi-
tal and total factor productivity. This appears to support the arguments of Acemoglu 
and Restrepo (2019) that the displacement effects in the labour market (shifting the 
task content of production against labour) are stronger than the reinstatement effects 
(because of the emergence of new production tasks in favour of labour).11
With the pandemic in the rearview mirror, how can it create any upside opportu-
nity regarding a rise in investment and TFP growth in the coming decade? This paper 
identified various key factors which have emerged during the pandemic, including an 
acceleration in digital transformation and a productivity catch-up in medium work-
from-home industries. There will also be an important role for human capital or 
increased labour quality, as identified in Fig. 4. Estimates of labour quality growth 
in the UK, measuring the mix of skills held by workers employed, showed a posi-
tive contribution to output growth during the pandemic, suggesting that the highest 
skilled workers were able to continue working throughout the pandemic while their 
less skilled counterparts were furloughed or otherwise unable to work (ONS 2021b).
Companies may also have used the lockdown period to upgrade and improve 
business systems, which might make them better prepared for a productivity-driven 
recovery. Investment data for the UK show that business investment in ICT equip-
ment and other machinery and equipment has fared better during the pandemic than 
that for buildings and transport equipment. Investment in intellectual property prod-
ucts has also performed relatively well in the UK during the pandemic, suggesting 
Fig. 4  Contribution of factor deepening, factor quality and efficiency changes to labour productivity 
growth.  Source The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook, 2021. For methodology see Footnote 
10 and Erumban and de Vries (2018)
11 The displacement effects reflect the shift in the task content from labor in favor of capital and improv-
ing productivity due to automation, whereas the reinstatement effect is the offsetting effect of automation 
by creating new tasks (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019).
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that digital transformation is accompanied by increased investment in productivity-
enhancing assets (ONS 2021f).
The overall productivity trend during the post-pandemic period will ultimately 
depend on whether such positive effects outweigh possible negative effects from the pan-
demic, in particular scarring effects on labour markets and business dynamics. A key 
risk is that the pandemic may have raised inequalities between particular occupational 
groups and places in terms of access to jobs and potential for productivity growth. This 
could be exacerbated by the displacement effects from new digital technologies. There 
could be a slowdown in the creation of new digital and other skills among workers not 
having gained on-the-job experience. This may cause an unbalanced or K-shaped recov-
ery with large pockets of weak demand and slow investment across the economy.
A second risk to a recovery in productivity relates to the evolution of business 
dynamics during the post pandemic period. According to the ONS, business closures 
in the UK dropped over the course of 2020, but started to pick up again above previ-
ous years’ average in Q4-20 and Q1-21 (ONS 2021d). The largest number of busi-
ness closures occurred in the finance and insurance, real estate, and information and 
communication industries. Towards the end of 2020 and Q1-21, the number of new 
businesses created picked up substantially above the average of previous years, espe-
cially in retail, wholesale, and transportation and storage industries. These business 
dynamics will shape the extent to which resources (labour, capital, land) released 
from ailing firms will be absorbed by firms that are more productive.12 One risk is 
that firm births do not necessarily occur in the sectors that have shown high levels of 
productivity in the past (NIESR 2021). More broadly, recent research suggests that 
the business environment in the US has not been very conducive to dynamic market 
competition lately, even though European countries may have shown more competi-
tive dynamics (Philippon 2019).
Finally, the large differences in within-industry productivity performance 
between countries also suggest that country-specific factors such as the response of 
innovation ecosystems to the opportunities for adoption of new technologies play an 
important role in explaining differences in productivity growth between countries 
during the next decade. Such differences in policy environment may also have a sig-
nificant impact on the within-country regional distribution of a productivity revival.
Appendix 1: Detailed industry quarterly productivity statistics 
for the UK, France and the US
Detailed quarterly industry productivity data on nominal and real value added and 
total hours worked are readily available for the UK from the ONS.13 The data is 
available for 66 industries, which is the level of detail that we use for the analysis 
throughout this paper. Quarterly detailed industry productivity data for France and 
the US are however not readily available, and a main contribution of this paper is 
indeed the development of these series (see Tables 4,  5, 6).
12 See also OECD (2021b).
13 See https:// www. ons. gov. uk/ econo my/ econo micou tputa ndpro ducti vity/ produ ctivi tymea sures# datas ets.
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Data for France are mostly derived from annual and quarterly national accounts 
data provided by INSEE and detailed short-term business statistics provided by Euro-
stat. Our starting point is the quarterly national accounts data on nominal and real 
value added and total hours worked for 17 broad sectors. We then use more detailed 
annual national accounts data to break up those 17 broad sectors into 50 more 
detailed sectors for 1  year. To derive the quarterly movement of value added and 
hours worked for those 50 sectors we use short-term business statistics on output and 
labour input, sourced from Eurostat. Finally, we make sure that the quarterly move-
ments sum up to the broad sectors derived from the quarterly national accounts data.
The quarterly productivity series for the US were derived from various datasets sourced 
from the BEA and BLS. The BLS maintains various productivity datasets, but the indus-
try detail in the quarterly series is very limited. More importantly, non-market and non-
farm output are excluded, hampering international comparability. Therefore our starting 
point is the GDP by industry data from the BEA. We then matched these detailed industry 
nominal and real value added data with labour input data. The labour input data by indus-
try are sourced from the Current Employment Statistics (CES). However, these data are 
on an ‘hours paid’ basis (not on an ’hours worked’ basis) and exclude various segments 
of the workforce such as the self-employed, agriculture and public sector workers. We 
Table 4  Decomposition of within-industry productivity effects using three taxonomies, by quarter, 
France (% change). Sources “Appendix 1”. Based on INSEE (France)
a Other industry includes agriculture, mining, utilities and construction
b Market services excludes Hospitality and culture as well as owner occupied dwellings
2020-Q1 2020-Q2 2020-Q3 2020-Q4 2021-Q1
Aggregate output per hour  − 1.5 6.3  − 3.5 1.3 0.0
 Within-industry productivity  − 2.5 4.7  − 1.1 0.6  − 0.2
 Static effect 1.1 2.0  − 2.2 0.8 0.3
 Dynamic effect  − 0.1  − 0.4  − 0.2  − 0.1 0.0
Sectors
 Total within-industry effect  − 2.5 4.7  − 1.1 0.6  − 0.2
 Manufacturing  − 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1
 Other  industrya  − 0.3 0.0 0.0  − 0.1  − 0.1
 Market  servicesb  − 1.3 4.1  − 1.7 0.4  − 0.4
 Hospitality and culture  − 0.3 0.5  − 0.3 0.2 0.0
 Non-market services  − 0.2 0.1 0.7  − 0.1 0.1
Work-from-home (WFH) intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 2.5 4.7  − 1.1 0.6  − 0.2
 High WFH 0.1 1.3  − 1.3 0.5  − 0.3
 Medium WFH  − 1.3 3.1 0.3 0.1 0.0
 Low WFH  − 1.3 0.3  − 0.1  − 0.1 0.0
Digital intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 2.5 4.7  − 1.1 0.6  − 0.2
 Most digital intensive-using  − 1.2 2.6  − 0.4 0.1  − 0.6
 Least digital intensive using  − 1.2 1.5  − 0.5 0.3 0.2
 Digital producing  − 0.1 0.6  − 0.2 0.1 0.2
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use ratios of hours paid over hours worked from a number of broader sectors (or ‘par-
ent industries’) to arrive at hours worked series at a detailed industry level. We then use 
unpublished employee/non-employee ratios derived from the CPS to arrive at total hours 
worked for all workers. Finally, we supplement the series with total hours worked meas-
ures on farm workers and public sector employees. In a final step, we make sure that the 
quarterly total economy total hours worked align with the quarterly sector totals from the 
BLS. This allows us to analyse the productivity movements of 48 detailed industries in the 
US economy.
When the goal is to tease out reallocation effects in productivity analysis, it is 
important to take out the value of owner-occupied housing. This is estimated in the 
compilation of GDP in the national accounts  by assuming that home-owners pay 
market rents. However, as this value has no labour equivalent (at least not in a nar-
row ‘production boundary’ sense), the implied ratio of output to labour input (or, 
the level of productivity) of the real estate sector is strongly inflated when includ-
ing owner-occupied housing. We therefore removed the value of owner occupied 
dwellings from nominal and real value added on a quarterly basis, thereby bringing 
Table 5  Decomposition of within-industry productivity effects using three taxonomies by quarter, UK 
(% change). Sources “Appendix 1”. Based on ONS
a Other industry includes agriculture, mining, utilities and construction
b Market services excludes hospitality and culture as well as owner occupied dwellings
2020-Q1 2020-Q2 2020-Q3 2020-Q4 2021-Q1
Aggregate output per hour  − 0.9  − 3.1 8.5  − 4.2 0.5
 Within-industry productivity  − 1.5  − 7.7 9.8  − 3.7 0.0
 Static effect 0.7 3.9  − 1.8  − 0.2 1.0
 Dynamic effect  − 0.1 0.7 0.4  − 0.3  − 0.4
Sectors
 Total within-industry effect  − 1.5  − 7.7 9.8  − 3.7 0.0
 Manufacturing 0.0  − 0.6 1.4  − 0.5 0.0
 Other  industrya  − 0.3  − 0.6 1.5  − 0.7 0.4
 Market  servicesb  − 0.7  − 1.9 3.3  − 2.0 0.1
 Hospitality and culture  − 0.2  − 2.1 1.9  − 1.0 0.6
 Non-market services  − 0.4  − 2.6 1.7 0.5  − 1.1
Work-from-home (WFH) intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 1.5  − 7.7 9.8  − 3.7 0.0
 High WFH  − 0.6  − 1.8 2.0  − 0.6  − 0.6
 Medium WFH  − 0.5  − 2.2 3.2  − 1.2 0.1
 Low WFH  − 0.4  − 3.7 4.7  − 1.9 0.5
Digital intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 1.5  − 7.7 9.8  − 3.7 0.0
 Most digital intensive-using  − 0.7  − 1.8 3.7  − 2.2 0.2
 Least digital intensive using  − 0.9  − 5.7 6.1  − 1.6  − 0.3
 Digital producing 0.1  − 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
563Productivity and the pandemic: shortterm disruptions and…
1 3
the productivity levels of the real estate sector more in line with the market services 
aggregate productivity level.
Appendix 2: Alternative aggregation methods
This paper uses a shift-share decomposition of aggregate productivity growth 
to distinguish pure or within-industry productivity effect from hours realloca-
tion effects. An important advantage of the shift-share method, especially when 
looked at from a structural change perspective, is the ability to distinguish 
between the static and dynamic reallocation effects. Another important feature is 
the additivity of real output, so that aggregate output can simply be obtained by 
summing output across industries. However, as the changes in output prices dif-
fer across industries at a different pace, the shift-share decomposition is sensi-
tive to the base year chosen. We discuss two alternative aggregation procedures 
Table 6  Decomposition of within-industry productivity effects using three taxonomies, by quarter, US 
(% change). Sources “Appendix 1”. Based on BEA and BLS
a Other industry includes agriculture, mining, utilities and construction
b Market services excludes hospitality and culture as well as owner occupied dwellings
2020-Q1 2020-Q2 2020-Q3 2020-Q4 2021-Q1
Aggregate output per hour  − 0.2 2.4 1.0  − 0.9 0.8
 Within-industry productivity  − 0.3  − 0.3 2.6  − 0.7 1.0
 Static effect 0.1 2.6  − 1.6  − 0.2  − 0.2
 Dynamic effect 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sectors
 Total within-industry effect  − 0.3  − 0.3 2.6  − 0.7 1.0
 Manufacturing 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
 Other  industrya 0.4 0.2  − 0.1  − 0.2 0.1
 Market  servicesb  − 0.4 0.3 1.2  − 0.4 1.0
 Hospitality and culture  − 0.1  − 0.6 0.3  − 0.1 0.1
 Non-market services  − 0.2  − 0.2 0.6 0.0  − 0.2
Work-from-home (WFH) intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 0.3  − 0.3 2.6  − 0.7 1.0
 High WFH 0.1  − 0.1 0.5  − 0.2 0.4
 Medium WFH  − 0.4 0.4 1.3  − 0.2 0.4
 Low WFH 0.0  − 0.7 0.8  − 0.2 0.2
Digital intensity
 Total within-industry effect  − 0.3  − 0.3 2.6  − 0.7 1.0
 Most digital intensive-using  − 0.5 0.0 1.2  − 0.1 0.5
 Least digital intensive using 0.1  − 0.9 1.3  − 0.6 0.1
 Digital producing 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.4
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that consider the price differences across industries—the Tornqvist aggregation 
and the Tang and Wang aggregation approach.
The Tornqvist aggregation
In Eq. (1) of the main text, aggregate real value added is the sum of industry value 
added, assuming identical value added function across industries. The alternative 
Tornqvist aggregation procedure relaxes the assumption of an identical value-added 
function across industries by defining aggregate value added growth as a weighted 
average of industry value added growth rates, thereby sacrificing the additivity of 
industry output. In this approach, aggregate value added growth is a translog index 
of industry value added growth, allowing estimation of aggregate labour productiv-
ity growth:
where vi,t is the share of industry i in aggregate nominal value added, averaged over 
the years t and t − 1. Note that Δlny∗
t
 in (4) is not the same as the growth rate of 
value added per hour ( yt) in (1), as the assumption of additivity imposed in Eq. (1) 
is relaxed in (4). Stiroh (2002) provides a useful decomposition of (4) into pure pro-
ductivity and worker reallocation components. Defining aggregate hours growth as a 
translog index of industry hours growth (with the value added weights) and replac-
ing for ΔlnHt in (4), we have
where RL,t =
∑
vi,t ⋅ ΔlnHi,t − ΔlnHt . In (5), the first term is the direct productivity 
effect. When the productivity of an industry improves, the aggregate productivity 
also improves in proportion to industry size (or the share in value added v ). The 
second term, RL , is a reallocation of working hours to sectors with relatively high 
productivity levels. It implies that aggregate productivity improves if industries with 
value added shares above employment shares experience employment growth. In 
other words, if workers move to sectors where relative levels of labour productivity 
are high, RL will be positive. In this approach, the worker reallocation can be easily 
obtained as a residual after subtracting the translog index of industry labour produc-
tivity growth from aggregate labour productivity growth obtained using production 
possibility frontier (Eq. 2). This approach also helps one identify the contribution 
of each individual industry to aggregate within or pure productivity effect, which is 
nothing but the share weighted sum of individual industry productivity growth.
In terms of the within-industry productivity effect, the difference between the 
shift-share and Tornqvist aggregation methods is primarily that the log difference in 
industry productivity is aggregated using industry output share according to Torn-
qvist whereas the shift-share method uses the industry employment shares in the 
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Tang and Wang decomposition
Tang and Wang (2004) introduced another alternative approach that addresses the 
sensitivity of aggregation to price differences between industries.14 In the shift-share 
and Tornqvist approaches, we indicated that the aggregate labour productivity is 
seen as the sum of within-industry productivity—contribution of individual indus-
tries—and the reallocation of workers across sectors. Tang and Wang (2004) sug-
gests a third component, which is the rise of industry output price. Given that real 
GDP is the measured as nominal GDP divided by aggregate GDP price deflator, 





t Yt) . Therefore, aggregate labour productivity is defined as yt = Ynt ∕P
y
t Ht . 







) , aggregate labour productivity can be written as industry 
summation as:














 , i.e., the product of relative output prices 
(the  industry output price relative to the  aggregate output price) and the industry 
employment share in the total economy. In other words, Tang and Wang’s decompo-
sition uses employment shares adjusted by output price to weight industry labour 
productivity to obtain aggregate labour productivity. The weight w is equivalent to 
the revenue share of workers, or the share of the product of output prices and indus-
try employment in the product of output prices and total economy employment. 
Transforming this into growth rate form,




− 1 is the growth rate of labour productivity, and as in 
(4), v is the nominal value added share of industry i in total GDP.
The first component is the product of labour productivity growth and nominal out-
put share in the base year. This basically measures each industry’s contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth, weighted by its relative size in the industry. Thus, as 
in the Tornqvist approach, the within-industry productivity effects in this approach is 
based on the growth rate of industry productivity weighted by industry value added 













































14 Tang and Wang’s approach is used by statistical agencies such as the ONS and Statistics Canada.
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uses the average output share in the current and base year. An important feature of this 
decomposition is in its treatment of the second term, the reallocation effect.
The second term is the product of relative levels of labour productivity for any 
given industry in the initial period and the change in employment share, where the 
latter is adjusted for relative output prices. This indicates whether employment is 
shifting to sectors where the relative level of productivity is high—similar to the 
static effect in the shift-share analysis. However, productivity levels are expressed in 
relative terms, and the employment shares are expressed in nominal terms. There-
fore, the change in the relative size of an industry can happen either because of 
a quantitative shifts in employment or because of  a change in output prices (or a 
combination of the two). The last term is the second term times labour productiv-
ity growth, and hence an interaction term, which measures the so-called Baumol 
effect—i.e., whether resources move from low growth to high growth sectors—simi-
lar to the dynamic effect in the shift-share analysis. In the shift-share method the 
dynamic effect is the product of change in employment share and change in produc-
tivity, whereas here it is the product of change in employment (adjusted for relative 
prices) share, productivity growth and the previous period relative labour productiv-
ity level.
A disadvantage of the Tang and Wang method is that it is difficult to distinguish 
between the pure effect of a shift in employment across sectors and the change in 
relative prices, as it uses both measures as weights. A decline in employment share 
can be offset by a rise in relative output prices (De Avillez 2012).15 For instance, 
as noted by Reinsdorf (2015), an increase  in the prices of products produced in a 
domestic industry due to a fall in imports of those products (or due to any sort of 
import restriction) may result in counting that industry’s contribution positively to 
aggregate productivity growth. This is not necessarily a labour reallocation effect, 
but a reflection of the windfall gain accrued to that industry due to the apparent 
decline in imports. Reinsdorf (2015), argues that treating an increase in the output 
price of an industry as a positive contribution to aggregate productivity growth is 
Table 7  Industry labour reallocation effects under alternative aggregation approaches (percentages): UK 
(%, quarter over quarter)
Real estate sector is excluded from the aggregation
2019 2020
Q1 (%) Q2 (%) Q3 (%) Q4 (%) Q1 (%) Q2 (%) Q3 (%) Q4 (%)
Shift-share 0.1 0.1 0.1  − 0.5 0.6 4.6  − 1.4  − 0.4
Tornqvist 0.2 0.1 0.1  − 0.4 0.7 4.2  − 1.4  − 0.4
Tang and Wang 0.1 0.3 0.1  − 0.5 0.7 6.3  − 4.2  − 1.0
15 For instance, as De Avillez (2012) argues, if a rise in its relative prices offsets a fall in employment 
share in a sector, the reallocation effect will cancel out. In other words, this approach treats output price 
rises as a positive contribution to aggregate productivity growth, which is inconsistent with the concept 
of productivity (Reinsdorf 2015).
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inconsistent with definition of productivity growth.16 Thus, as this approach inter-
prets a rise in industry output price as a rise in productivity, it is not a measure 
of productivity contribution in the traditional sense, rather an estimate of economic 
value generated by industries. For instance, in this approach, it is likely that high-
tech industries with massive increases in real output and productivity contribute 
negatively to aggregate productivity growth if they see rapid declines in output 
prices owing to technology improvements. In contrast, industries with falling pro-
ductivity and rising prices can make positive contributions.17
Table  7  compares the differences in the industry reallocation effects according 
to the shift-share, Tornqvist and Tang and Wang methods for the UK. First, we find 
that the reallocation effects in 2020 are indeed extremely large compared to a normal 
year like 2019, especially for Q2-20 and Q3-20. Second, we find that the Tang and 
Wang method tends to provide somewhat larger reallocation effects than the other 
two methods, which especially impacted Q2-20 and Q3-20 (see Table 7).
Since our focus is on the pure or within-industry productivity effects, it may be 
noted that in all these three approaches, the within effect is a weighted aggregate 
of industry productivity growth. However, the weights differ—hours (shift-share) or 
output share (Tang and Wang approach) in the previous period, or a two period aver-
age of output shares (Tornqvist). In this paper, we opt for the shift-share approach, 
which weighs industry productivity growth rates by their base year level of total 
hours. We acknowledge that the pure effect we consider in the paper takes care of 
only the movement of workers between sectors and not of measurement issues or 
price differences between sectors as discussed above.
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